The problem of strategic arms reduction in the context of modern Russian-American relations

Introduction. The article presents an analysis of the process of reducing strategic arms of Russia and the United States. The author gives an assessment of the Soviet-American détente and the Soviet-American disarmament treaties as laying the political normative and legal foundation for the development of the disarmament process after the end of the Cold War. The study analyzes the Russian-American New START Treaty concluded by Presidents B. Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in 2010. Particular attention is paid to the problem of mutual inspections by Russia and the United States during the implementation of START-3.

Materials and methods. The study is based on the analysis of Soviet-American and Russian-American treaties in the field of disarmament, materials from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the American administration of J. Biden, and publications in the American press. A systematic integrated approach, specific historical and comparative historical methods were used.

Analysis. According to official data from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the American side resorted to certain “tricks” - not only actually reducing weapons, but achieving final results by converting some weapons into non-nuclear or training ones. The Russian department could not confirm that these strategic weapons were rendered unusable as provided for by the treaty. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and the beginning of the Russian SVO the following issues became particularly difficult in the process of mutual verification of disarmament: the cessation of regular air traffic, the extension of flight times, which could contribute to the “leakage” of confidential information; the complexity of the visa regime for Russian specialists, especially in transit countries; difficulties in making Russian payments for verification services; the lack of unambiguous guarantees of providing the opportunity for aircraft of the Russian Ministry of Defense with inspectors on board to fly through the airspace of Western countries closed to Russia.

Results. A conclusion is drawn about the importance of signing New START treaty, which became a major milestone in the development of relations between Moscow and Washington in the military-political sphere. Violation of mutual inspection activities in the context of sanctions imposed by the West against Russia violated the principles of equal access to the Treaty verification mechanisms, created clear advantages for the American side and led to the suspension of Russia participation in New START.

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