DEBT FORGIVENESS AS A LEGAL FACT IN CIVIL LAW

Abstract

The article is devoted to the problem of debt forgiveness as a legal fact. It is noted that in connection with debt forgiveness, neither legislation nor civil doctrine properly distinguish between the concepts of «termination of a claim» and «termination of an obligation». A literal interpretation of the debt forgiveness provisions would mean that in a bilateral obligation, each of the parties would at any time can declare that it relieves the other of its obligations, and thus terminate not only its right of claim, but also the obligation as a whole, including its own obligations together with the corresponding rights of the counterparty. A systematic interpretation of clause 1 of article 415 of the civil code of the Russian Federation in the context of other norms of the law of obligations leads to the conclusion that debt forgiveness is a legal fact that terminates an obligation only if the creditor itself does not bear any obligations to the debtor. However, under this interpretation, the participants in the obligation are in an unequal position: the right to forgive the debt is not held by both parties, but only by the one who initially had no obligations, or the one who irst performed them. Debt forgiveness is a unilateral expression of will in which notiication on the one hand is a suficient reason for termination of the legal relationship, but this legal effect can be blocked by a counter-unilateral objection of the other party.